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ENVIRONMENTAL HEDONISM OR, SECURING THE
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH THE COMMON LAW
GEORGE P. SMITH, II* & DAVID M. STEENBURG**
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
–The Declaration of Independence, ¶ 1, July 4, 17761
INTRODUCTION AND . . . OVERVIEW
While the pursuit of happiness did not morph into the U.S. Con-
stitution as a constitutional right to pleasure, much “sentimentalism”
still infects contemporary thinking about issues concerning the manage-
ment and the use of the environment as a construct for finding a level of
peace and harmony and—at the same time—of safeguarding the beauties
of nature for future generations to behold and honor.2 Over the years,
efforts have been mounted to enact a conservation bill of rights which
would, in turn, provide recognition of a cognizable right to a decent en-
vironment.3 A constitutional amendment to secure and safeguard envi-
ronmental rights for all citizens has even been thought of as holding
great promise to do for the environment what was done by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution for civil rights.4
While a right with constitutional status would, indeed, create a
judicial opportunity for its enforcement by the courts, it would also pro-
vide the courts with an ultimate level of unfettered authority. Thus, a
judicially declared constitutional right cannot be overruled subsequently by
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1 The United States Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 234 (1970).
3 Id. at 235.
4 Id.
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the legislatures.5 Yet, a court enforcing a statutory right which may have
the exact wording contained in a constitutional provision may, by subse-
quent legislation, be overruled.6
Other fundamental uncertainties have pervaded these notions for
environmental law-making for quite some time.7 How would environmental
rights be enforceable, and who would enforce them, are but two concerns.8
Early thought suggested a separate specialized court for the environment
could be created—much as other specialized courts were created for the
International Trade, Customs and Patents, and Tax, for example.9
Accommodating ecological values in environmental protection is
exceedingly complicated and difficult as is assessing risks for environ-
mental misconduct.10 Comparative risk assessment (“CRA”) has been
developed, however, and allows scientific experts to analyze “the best avail-
able data to decide which environmental risks are the worst.”11 A risk
ordering, then, may be made by decision makers for determining priorities
for affirmative environmental actions. Normally, the decision reached is
that “more resources should be directed toward higher risks than toward
lower risks.”12
Important though scientific risk assessments are in environmental
policy-making, normative issues pervade the whole of environmental law.
Four such fundamental issues are: the extent of equity among risk-bearers;
the nature of public obligations to future generations as well as other spe-
cies; the extent to which individual risk preferences should be subordinated
5 Id. at 236.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 235.
8 George P. Smith, II, The Environment and The Judiciary: A Need for Co-operation or
Reform?, 3 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1974). Interestingly, since 1970, almost all federal
environmental legislation has authorization for citizen enforcement and often possibilities
of reimbursement of enforcement costs. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 57 (Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Robert H. Abrams, Robert L. Graham, Lisa
Heinzerling, David A. Wirth, & Noah D. Hall eds., 4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY].
9 Smith, supra note 8. See George P. Smith, II, Does The Environment Need A Court?, 57
JUDICATURE 150 (1973) (discussing the practicality of establishing a federal court for the
environment).
10 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117.
11 Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.
J. 255, 255 (1994).
12 Id. Expanding CRAs to encompass all health and safety risks under a process denomi-
nated SRR or societal risk reduction, has been encouraged by some. Id. at 256, 262–63.
See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1999) (discussing the complexities of regulating decision-making).
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to collective decision making; and whether CRAs should be given greater
emphasis in policy-making.13 Indeed, the very substance of modern en-
vironmental law has been termed a “composite of moral decisions.”14
The present system of environmental law-making runs a precari-
ous gamut of rank “forms of special interest politics” to governmental
actions which are “manifestations of selfish political behaviors.”15 With-
out regard for cost or economic efficiency, numerous statutory provisions
seek to validate absolutist rights.16 Slow methodical efforts by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to identify—industry by industry—the
best available technology which should be attained for environmental
safety defy swift, decision policy-making.17 Bursts of regulatory innova-
tion come spasmodically from the states, the courts, and from administra-
tive agencies, the White House, and Congress.18 Environmental reforms
“should aspire both to improve the effectiveness of environmental protec-
tions and to highlight the moral discourse that has traditionally shaped
environmental law.”19 Land use regulation presents a perfect paradigm
of dysfunctionality in environmental management.20
Under what is termed the Subsidiarity Principle, local govern-
ments—acting in wide environmental settings from land use to federal
pollution legislation—are recognized as the primary decision-making units
where most rational allocation decisions can, and should, be made.21
Indeed, at its most elementary level of application, this principle ac-
knowledges that “it is the individual who is best suited to make land use
decisions.”22 Yet, when national standards for environmental manage-
ment are set by federal legislation, it remains for the central government
to be the decisive decision maker. Co-operative federalism is, however,
the ideal goal.23
13 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Compara-
tive Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 565 (1992).
14 Id. at 631.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 630.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 630–31.
19 Id. at 629.
20 See JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW: STAND-
ING GROUND ch. 1 (2014) (surveying the history and outreach by environmental law).
21 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8. See generally Symposium, Federalism
and The New Nationalism, 123 YALE L. J. 1889 (2014) (analyzing the history of federalism
and its contemporary reconfigurations).
22 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 368.
23 Id.
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Owing to countless dislocations between the states and the federal
government, national land use and the present “environmental legal
system” are deficient—this, principally, because there is an absence of a
“cogent framework of laws.”24 While the preservation of open land is now
seen as an integral part of an “overall community development and con-
servation strategy,”25 charting a balanced strategy which accommodates
development and conservation is quite challenging.26 Considerable strength
would be achieved if the reach of environmental law were broadened to
include land use.27
Presently, zoning is a traditional method for dealing with determin-
ing the points of balance within each state and its communities.28 Indeed,
the primacy of local power in this approach is paramount to any sustained
level of progress and ultimate success.29 “Cooperative government,” also
referred to as “reflexive law regimes” is thought to be the preferred method
of organization for aligning land use planning with environmental man-
agement.30 Accordingly, reflexive laws either “prescribe or suggest deci-
sion making processes that involve all relevant government agencies
[e.g., federal, state and local] and private sector and civic stakeholders in
developing and achieving performance-based solutions.”31
The Common Law must be acknowledged and accepted as the foun-
dational framework of the regulatory state at all three levels of gover-
nance: municipal, state, and federal.32 Nuisance Law,33 and particularly the
law of anticipatory nuisance,34 and the emergence of aesthetic nuisance,35
24 NOLON, supra note 20, at 255.
25 Id. at 178. Because Open Space Preservation serves multiple functions, defining it pre-
sents difficulties in precision. Open spaces are commonly seen, however, as including “parks,
ball fields, pastures and meadows, scenic vistas,” as well as “fragile environmental areas,
such as wetlands, ridgelines, and habitats” or “simply underdeveloped . . . land left in its
natural state for conservation purposes.” Id. at 175.
26 See id. at 177–78.
27 See id. at 168–69.
28 See id. at 178.
29 NOLON, supra note 20, at 176.
30 Id. at 40.
31 Id.
32 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at ch. 3.
33 See generally George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658 (1995).
34 See generally George P. Smith, II, Re-validating The Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance,
29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2004).
35 See generally George P. Smith, II, & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Eco-
nomic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (1991).
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together with the outreach of the Doctrine of Public Trust,36 provide a
strong arsenal in safeguarding the environment. Indeed, the adaptability
of the law of nuisance to any and all permutations of environmental
unreasonableness is owing in very large measure to the guidance of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (“the Restatement”);37 and the framework
that it provides for testing whether conduct is reasonable or tortious (i.e.,
unreasonable).38 The Restatement provides direction and focus to the
most well-established guiding common law principle of the law of nui-
sance, sic uteri’s tuo ut alienum non laedas, which mandates the use of
one’s property not be injurious to another’s property.39
Sic uteri’s eponymous “legacy” to the law of nuisance is seen when
it is realized as a framework for shaping the perimeter of the threshold
inquiry whether a particular set of facts may be characterized as being
a nuisance.40 Under this admittedly open-ended maxim, any conduct which
interferes with a property owner’s enjoyment of his or her real property
is held actionable as a form of strict liability.41 In a very real way, then,
the Restatement “fleshes out” what are the vectors of force which classify
conduct as unreasonable.42
Part I of this Article investigates whether a “right” to environmen-
tal hedonism can be claimed and compensated for when the environment
is degraded. Building upon the economic and mathematical uncertainties
in assessing any claim for loss of enjoyment of the environment, Part II
considers the evaluation of environmental harms ex post through use of re-
storative damages—as allowed under the Restatement (Second) of Torts—
and concludes that because of the ambiguities in public policy for not only
determining what is an “appropriate” case for award of restorative damages
but also in evaluating the nature and scope of environmental injuries,
36 See generally George P. Smith, II, & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006).
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 827, 828 (1979).
38 Id. at §§ 827, 828.
39 Daniel R. Coquillette, Masses From an Odd Manse: Another Look at Some Historic
Property Cases About the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 793 (1979). See also
Lawrence H. White, Economic and Nuisance Law: Comment on Manson, 8 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 213 (1985) (analyzing Sic uteri’s usefulness in shaping a case in nuisance).
40 Smith, supra note 34, at 680. See Richard A. Epstein, Modern Environmentalists
Overreach: A Plea for Understanding Background Common Law Principles, 37 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (2014) (analyzing the importance of Common Law Nuisance in the
basic framework of environmental protection).
41 Smith, supra note 34, at 680–81.
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827, 828. See Smith, supra note 34, at 698.
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restorative damages are deficient as a tool for protecting environmental
degradations. Part III studies the parens patriae powers of the government
to manage and to protect the environment as a source for securing the
environment and finds justification for its exercise in the application and
use of the Doctrine of Public Trust. Part IV examines the common law of
nuisance—and especially anticipatory and aesthetic nuisance—concluding,
as such, that this body of law provides the strongest remedial base for pro-
tecting assaults on the environment.
I. HEDONIC DAMAGES
Hedonism is recognized as a “doctrine or theory of ethics in which
pleasure is regarded as the chief good or the proper end of action.”43 One
who embraces this ancient Greek philosophy is, then, seen as a hedonist.44
Thus, one who finds happiness and pleasure by and through use of the
environment may be properly termed an environmental hedonist.45
Hedonic damages are intended to compensate victims for the loss
of enjoyment of life’s pleasures. The theory underlying hedonic damages
is based on the notion that “the value of life cannot be reduced to mea-
surements of economic productivity,” but rather consists in those experi-
ences and pleasures that “make life valuable to its holder.”46 As Michael
Brookshire and Stan Smith, two of the leading proponents for hedonic
damages, explain:
The hedonic value of life refers to the value of pleasure, the
satisfaction, or the “utility” that human beings derive from
life, separate and apart from the labor or earnings value
of life. To determine the hedonic loss, we seek to measure
the value of human beings separate from the value of their
output as mere “economic machines.”47
43 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at 98 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds. 2d ed. 1989).
44 Id.
45 MICHAEL L. BROOKSHIRE & STAN V. SMITH, ECONOMIC/HEDONIC DAMAGES: THE PRACTICE
BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 164 (1990 & 1992–1993 cum. Supp.).
46 Joseph A. Kuiper, The Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Doubtful Future of
Hedonic Damages Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
1197, 1205 (1996). See generally Andrew Jay McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for
Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 58 (1990) (arguing that
life itself has intrinsic value which should be recognized in tort law).
47 BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 45. Interestingly, Jeremy Bentham’s very notion of util-
itarianism has become, for some economists, a measurable factor. Termed, “hedonimetrists,”
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A. Sherrod v. Berry
The term “hedonic damages” was first introduced to courts in the
case of Sherrod v. Berry.48 In Sherrod, a nineteen-year-old man, Ronald
Sherrod, was in a vehicle with his friend, Gary Duckworth, who had re-
cently robbed a local store.49 Officer Berry stopped Sherrod and Duckworth
and ordered them to exit the vehicle.50 After exiting the vehicle, Berry
alleged that he saw Sherrod reach for his left breast pocket. Berry then
proceeded to fire at him because he believed Sherrod was armed.51 Sherrod
and Duckworth were both unarmed and no weapon was found in the car.52
Lucien Sherrod, the father of the victim, brought a wrongful death
action against Officer Berry, the City of Joliet, Illinois, and the city’s
Police Chief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.53 At trial, Lucien Sherrod enlisted
Stan Smith, an economist educated at the University of Chicago and co-
author of the leading guide for attorneys on hedonic damages, as an ex-
pert witness to prove the damages that he suffered from the loss of his
son.54 The defendants filed a motion in limine asking that Smith’s testi-
mony on the hedonic value of Ronald’s life be excluded on the grounds
that it was speculative.55 The motion was denied and the court ruled that
such testimony was not speculative and was both relevant and material
and would aid the jury in the determining the proper amount of damages
if it found for Sherrod.56
utility is measured as a “quantum of pleasure or pain.” Led today by Nobelist Daniel
Kahneman of Princeton, hedonic states of satisfaction can be evaluated and measured
not only by actual self-reports of pleasure and observation of facial features, but also by
planting electrodes into human scalps that “reveal . . . the frequency of voltages of electrical
waves in their left forebrain which sparks up when they are feeling good.” Quantifying
hedonic damages in dollar amounts obviously remains problematic. Economics discovers
its feelings, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, at 33.
48 Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff’d, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988).
49 Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 161.
50 Id.
51 Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted and opinion vacated,
835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988), reh’g en banc, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
52 Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff’d, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir.
1987), reh’g granted and opinion vacated, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988), reh’g en banc,
856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
53 Id.
54 Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 162.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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At trial, Smith offered testimony about both the economic value
and “hedonic value” of Ronald’s life.57 The court asked Smith to define the
word “hedonic” for the jury as used in the expression “the hedonic value
of life” and Smith testified that:
It derives from the word pleasing or pleasure. I believe it
is a Greek word. It is distinct from the word economic. So
it refers to the larger value of life, the life at the pleasure of
society, if you will, the life—the value including economic,
including moral, including philosophical, including all the
value with which you might hold life, is the meaning of the
expression “hedonic value.”58
Smith then proceeded to testify that he believed the hedonic value
of life could be estimated between three to thirty times the present value
of lost future earnings.59 The jury awarded Lucien Sherrod $450,000 for
lost parental companionship, $300,000 for economic loss to the estate,
$1,700 for funeral expense, and for the first time in the American legal
system, $850,000 for the hedonic value of Ronald’s life.60
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
defendants contended that the trial court erred in admitting Smith’s testi-
mony on the hedonic value of Ronald’s life.61 On this point, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the trial judge’s admission of Smith’s testimony, noting
that “[t]he testimony of expert economist Stanley Smith was invaluable
to the jury in enabling it to perform its function of determining the most
accurate and probable estimate of the damages recoverable for the hedonic
value of Ronald’s life.62 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the trial court
committed no error by admitting Smith’s testimony.”63
B. Willingness to Pay
Although there are many different approaches to computing he-
donic damages, most hedonic experts use the “willingness to pay” (“WTP”)
approach.64 This approach measures the value of human life by examining
57 Id. at 162–63.
58 Id. at 163.
59 Id.
60 Sherrod, 629 F. Supp. at 159–60.
61 Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 205.
62 Id. at 195, 206.
63 Id.
64 BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 45, at 167.
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“what we pay to prevent the loss of life, [or] what we pay for life-saving
measures.”65 The WTP approach utilizes three models in order to quan-
tify the value of life for a jury: “(1) consumer willingness to purchase safety
devices; (2) worker willingness to accept higher compensation for a greater
risk of death; and (3) the government’s willingness to impose safety regula-
tions on private industries and the costs of these regulations.”66 Each of
these models seeks to ascertain how much one would pay to avoid death.67
The first model evaluates consumer behavior by looking at the price
a consumer is willing to pay for a safer product or safety device, such as a
smoke detector or a car with airbags, and the reduction of the risk of death
resulting from such a purchase.68 This information is then used to calculate
how much people value life by multiplying the probability that the safer
product or safety device will save a life by the cost of the product or device.69
The second model, often called the “individual avoidance” approach,
assumes that workers will demand higher wages for jobs that entail a
significant risk of death.70 In this model, higher wages are linked exclu-
sively with “direct forms of compensation.”71 For example, consider an
eighteen-year-old man earning twenty thousand dollars a year as a retail
store clerk—“an occupation with a negligible work-related risk of death.”72
Suppose that he is then offered a job as an assemblyman in an automo-
bile factory, a position that has a one in 10,000 annual risk of death. If he
accepts this position for an additional $10,000 in salary, then, under this
theory, he has accepted “certain death for 10,000 times this amount, or
$50,000,000 dollars.”73 Thus, under this theory, the eighteen-year-old
man values his life at fifty million dollars.
65 Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 949 P.2d 89, 92 (Colo. App. 1997) (quoting an economist
serving as an expert witness on hedonic damages).
66 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1061–62 (2004).
67 BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 45, at 166–70.
68 Id. at 167.
69 For example, “assume that consumers make an aggregate expenditure of $150 million dol-
lars on smoke detectors, and that these smoke detectors are estimated to save fifty lives each
year. This represents an aggregate safety expenditure of $150 million divided by fifty lives
or $3 million per statistical life saved.” Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 66, at 1062 n.116.
70 See BROOKSHIRE & SMITH, supra note 45, at 167.
71 Edward P. Berlá et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach,
3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 1, 5 (1989), available at http://expertecon.com/Assets/Documents
/Pub_Hedo_Jour.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PLQ-Q59E].
72 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 66, at 1062.
73 Id. at 1063. When administrative agencies fail to show the benefits of an agency regu-
lation do not appear to justify costs, OIRA will, under Executive Orders 12,866 and
13,563 raise questions regarding whether the agency should proceed with its actions. A 
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The third model is based on the cost-benefit analysis government
agencies employ in assessing whether to adopt safety regulations.74 This
utilization of cost-benefit analysis was mandated by Executive Order
12,291 and was signed into law by President Reagan in 1981.75 Under this
order, agencies are required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for regula-
tions that will have a significant economic impact and then submit the cost-
benefit analysis to the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (“OIRA”).76 Most of these analyses demonstrate “[a] willingness to
implement legislation at a cost of approximately two million dollars per
life saved [and] very little legislation beyond three million.”77
After determining the value of life from one of these three models,
experts who subscribe to the WTP approach “subject this amount to a ‘loss
of the pleasure of life’ [“LPL”] scale to determine hedonic damages.”78
Under this scale, an individual’s “degree of diminution of life that has been
experienced from the date of injury to the date of the evaluation” will be
assessed and then “the degree of diminution of life over the individual’s
remaining life span” will be estimated, with most estimates ranging from
the high six figures to high seven-figure amounts.79
C. Criticisms of the Willingness-to-Pay Model
There are numerous difficulties in calculating the value of life
through the willingness-to-pay model and indeed even the proponents of
the willingness-to-pay model recognize that it depends on “several un-
provable assumptions.”80 First, the WTP model rests on the assumption
challenged agency must demonstrate that the benefits from their action “ ‘justify’ the
costs, not that they ‘exceed’ the costs . . . . [E]ven if the monetized benefits are lower than
the monetized costs, the costs must nonetheless be justified.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING
LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 37 (2014). See also chs. 2, 4, and 5, as well as
app. E where values for mortality and morbidity, based on age and medical morbidities,
are analyzed.
74 Id.; see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (re-affirming the fact that adminis-
trative agencies are no longer given discretion to ignore the economic consequences of
their actions nor will they be allowed to act when the consequences of their regulatory
schemes generate costs which are disproportionate to the project’s benefits); Andrew
Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies to Consider Costs, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. at 281 (2014–15).
75 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
76 Id.
77 Anderson v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W. 2d 732, 743 (Neb. 1995).
78 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 66, at 1063.
79 Berlá et al., supra note 71, at 4.
80 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1211 (citing Stanley v. Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful
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that the hedonic value of life may be independent of its economic value.81
The hedonic value of a high-income individual is not greater or less than
the hedonic value of a person with a minimal income.82 Second, the model
assumes that the hedonic value of life is “independent of socioeconomic
characteristics” such as gender, wealth, education, and cultural capital.83
Third, the model assumes that the hedonic value of life is tied to life
expectancy and that individuals value life equally at different ages.84
Finally, the model assumes that the “hedonic value of each future year
has a zero real discount rate” and therefore the dollar value for each
future year need not be adjusted for inflation.85
The willingness-to-pay model also assumes that individuals accu-
rately perceive “probabilities of injury” and are “free to bargain over the
reductions of such risks.”86 Furthermore, the model assumes that “indi-
viduals will behave rationally when balancing risks and expenditures.”87
Another problem confronting courts’ use of hedonic damages is the
growing research pointing to “hedonic adaptation,” that is, the remark-
able ability of individuals to bounce back from difficult life circumstances.
Individuals who experience difficult life occurrences such as illness, in-
jury, unemployment, and divorce “often reclaim much of the hedonic
losses initially incurred as a result of the relevant event.”88 In light of
such “hedonic” adaptation, many commentators have been quick to point
out its implications for non-economic damages and that, at the very least,
“current damage awards are likely inflated from a hedonic perspective.”89
D. The Admissibility of Hedonic Damages Testimony
After Daubert
Another difficulty in the effectiveness of hedonic damages as a
remedy for environmental harms is the likelihood that hedonic damages
Death Cases, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1988, at 73 and Wolfgang W. Franz, Hedonic Damages: Apply-






86 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1211.
87 Id.
88 David E. DePianto, Tort Damages and the (Misunderstood) Money-Happiness Connection,
44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1385, 1387–89 (2012).
89 Id. at 1388. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008);
Sean H. Williams, Self-Altering Injury: The Hidden Harms of Hedonic Adaptation, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 535 (2011).
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testimony is inadmissible in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.90 Traditionally, the Ameri-
can judicial system had a “laissez-faire approach toward the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony,”91 and the only significant limitation placed on
expert testimony was that it be “beyond the ken of the jury.”92 The main
exception to this was that “many jurisdictions applied the general accep-
tance test of Frye v. United States to scientific testimony, mostly in criminal
cases.”93 The Frye “general acceptance” standard,94 which was named
after the 1923 case in which it originated, established that scientific evi-
dence was inadmissible if the techniques, theories, or principles on which
it was based had not gained the support of the scientists’ peers.95
The purpose of the Frye test was to prevent the introduction into
evidence of scientific testimony based on specious or untested scientific
theories or principles.96 However, “contrary to myth . . . Frye was not
traditionally a significant barrier to expert testimony.”97 In the decades
following the promulgation of the Frye standard, federal courts signifi-
cantly varied in their application of Frye, and further complicating its
application, federal courts disagreed about whether Frye had “survived”
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.98
This confusion ended when the Supreme Court adopted a reliabil-
ity test for expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.99 The plaintiffs, two minor children and their parents, sued Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., alleging that the children’s serious birth de-
fects had been caused by the mother’s prenatal ingestion of Benedictin,
a prescription drug marketed by Merrell Dow.100 In its defense, Merrell
90 DePianto, supra note 88, at 1387–88.
91 See David E. Bernstein, The Unfinished Daubert Revolution, 10 ENGAGE 35, 37 (2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354733 [http://perma.cc/5VRA-PEBK].
92 DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERSTEIN, & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE—EXPERT EVIDENCE § 2.1.1 (Richard D. Friedman, 2nd ed. 2010).
93 Id. § 1.2.
94 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
95 Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence—An Alternative to the Frye
Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 548 (1984).
96 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1224 (1980); John William Strong,
Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14.
97 David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 31 n.28 (2013).
98 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1219.
99 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
100 Id. at 582.
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Dow produced the affidavit of Dr. Steven H. Lamm, a noted epidemiolo-
gist and expert on the risks associated with chemical substances.101 The
affidavit concluded that the maternal use of Benedictin was not a risk
factor for birth defects and Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment.102
The petitioners responded to this affidavit with the testimony of
eight other experts, who concluded that Benedectin can cause birth defects
on the basis of the “[animal] studies, chemical structure analyses,” and
“the ‘reanalysis’ of previously published . . . studies.”103 Applying the Frye
test, the district court rejected the petitioners’ expert testimony and
granted Merrell Dow’s motion for summary judgment,104 noting that
scientific testimony is only admissible if the theories and principles on
which the testimony is based are “sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field to which [they] belong.”105
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that their expert testimony met
the Frye test because it was based on generally accepted scientific tech-
niques and principles.106 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention and affirmed the district court’s judg-
ment.107 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit adopted a particularly
strict interpretation of Frye and concluded that the plaintiffs’ testimony
did not satisfy the Frye test for scientific expert testimony because the
experts’ studies “were unpublished, not subject to the normal peer review
process and generated solely for use in litigation.108 It is not enough for
the expert’s methodology, the court wrote, to meet “some of the require-
ments imposed by the scientific community; it must meet all of the essen-
tial requirements. Selective borrowing from generally accepted scientific
methodology does not satisfy [this] rigorous standard.”109 In reaching its
decision, the Ninth Circuit relied almost exclusively on the Frye general
acceptance standard and only referenced the Federal Rules of Evidence
once in a footnote.110
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 583.
104 Id.
105 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp.
570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989)).
106 See id. at 584–85.
107 Id.
108 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
109 Id.
110 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1222.
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In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting scientific expert testi-
mony in federal courts.111 In its decision, the court rejected Frye as an
“austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Rules”112 and out
of step with the Federal Rules of Evidence’s “liberal thrust and their gen-
eral approach to relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”113
The Court’s decision in Daubert emphasized the trial judge’s role
as a gatekeeper who must determine whether the testimony satisfies Rule
702.114 There are two prongs in the Rule 702 analysis. First, “the subject
of an expert’s testimony must be ‘scientific . . . knowledge.’ ”115 The ex-
pert’s testimony must be “ground[ed] in the methods and procedures of
science” and be more than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”116
The second prong of Rule 702 analysis is that the evidence or testimony
must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue. This condition goes primarily to relevance.”117
Although the Daubert Court did not create a “definitive checklist
or test” for federal judges to apply in assessing scientific testimony under
Rule 702, the Court did offer four “general observations.”118 These “gen-
eral observations” are the “heart and soul of the Daubert analysis” and pro-
vide guidance to trial judges in assessing whether evidence or testimony
is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.119
First, trial judges should consider whether the proffered theory
or technique can be tested. “Scientific methodology today is based on
111 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
112 Id. at 589.
113 Id. at 588.
114 Id. at 588–89. Rule 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
See FED. R. EVID. 702.
115 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
116 Id. at 590.
117 Id. at 591.
118 Id. at 593.
119 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1225.
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generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified;
indeed this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields
of human inquiry.”120
Second, trial judges should consider whether “the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”121 Although
publication is not the “sine qua non of admissibility” and some “well-
grounded but innovative theories will not have been published,” peer
review and publication is a component of good science and “increases the
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”122
The third factor courts should consider is “the known or potential
rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards control-
ling the technique’s operation.”123 The fourth factor is the “general accep-
tance” of a scientific theory or technique in the scientific community.124
Although “general acceptance” is no longer the controlling factor in as-
sessing scientific expert testimony, the Daubert Court reasoned that it
is an important factor and that techniques or theories that were only able
to attract minimal support in the scientific community “may properly be
viewed with skepticism.”125 Thus, although Daubert rejected the Frye
standard, general acceptance continues to play a role in determining the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony.126
Finally, Daubert requires the trial judge to consider other rele-
vant Federal Rules of Evidence in determining whether to admit scien-
tific expert testimony.127 The Daubert Court specifically noted that Rules
703, 706, and 403 were particularly relevant to this inquiry.128 The Court
120 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency
in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 645 (1992)).
121 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 594.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 595.
127 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
128 FED. R. EVID. 703 states:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in
forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inad-
missible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
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gave particular emphasis to the importance of Rule 403 and excluding
relevant evidence, noting that “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful
and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because
of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative
force under Rule 403 . . . exercises more control over experts than over
lay witnesses.”129
Post Daubert then, the question can be raised whether expert tes-
timony on hedonic damages is admissible in federal courts. As Daubert
made clear, before testimony on hedonic damages can be admitted, it
must be evaluated under Rule 702. First, the proffered testimony must
be “scientific knowledge.”130 Second, it must “assist the trier of fact.”131
As discussed, above, the Daubert Court identified several factors
courts should consider in determining whether testimony is scientific
knowledge. An analysis of hedonic damages testimony using three of
these factors—testability, peer review and publication, and the known or
potential error rate—casts considerable doubt that hedonic damages are
admissible under Daubert.
1. Testability
As the Court in Daubert noted, testability is at the heart of the
scientific method.132 It appears doubtful that hedonic damages calculated
under the willingness-to-pay model are testable. This model rests on the
assumption that people are willing to pay to reduce the probability of
death and that this willingness to pay is a reflection of the value that
society places on human life. Most proponents of hedonic damages con-
clude that the value of the statistically average life is between $0 and
$16,000,000 and base this range on what people spend on safety devices
FED. R. EVID. 706(a) states:
On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask
the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
that the parties agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court
may only appoint someone who consents to act.
Although hedonic damages are not barred and the Federal Torts
Claims Act, the federal government is not liable for punitive damages.
See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306–08 (1992).
129 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
130 FED. R. EVID. 702.
131 Id.
132 See Bender, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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and wage-risk premiums.133 However, even assuming the data is correct
“does not prove that this amount accurately reflects the value society places
on human life” and indeed appears incapable of empirical testing.”134
Numerous federal courts have come to this conclusion and rejected
testimony on hedonic damages because it fails to meet the requirement of
testability.135 For example, in Hein v. Merck & Co., the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee declined to admit hedonic damages
testimony in a personal injury suit.136 The court concluded that unlike
other forms of economic testimony on damages, hedonic damages testi-
mony was incapable of validation and therefore untestable.137 The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin similarly found he-
donic damages testimony inadmissible in Estate of Sinthasomphone v.
City of Milwaukee.138 In its decision, the court concluded that hedonic
damages testimony is, by its very nature, incapable of empirical testing,
for it attempts to “quantify something which cannot truly be determined:
what is the value of human life?”139 Thus, under Daubert, testimony on
hedonic damages will face considerable difficulty in meeting the require-
ment of testability.
2. Peer Review and Publication
Another factor in determining whether expert testimony is sci-
entific knowledge is whether it has been subjected to peer review and
publication in the relevant scientific community.140 Although hedonic
damages has received considerable attention in law journals, this attention
has not focused on the methodology underlying the willingness-to-pay
model.141 The empirical studies that have been published on the will-
ingness-to-pay model and its methodology and assumptions have been
published almost exclusively by the forensic economists who created the
theory of hedonic damages.142 Moreover, many of these same forensic
economists routinely hire themselves out as expert witnesses to testify
133 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1228–29.
134 Id. at 1229.
135 Id. at 1228–29.
136 Hein v. Merck & Co., 868 F. Supp. 230, 235 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
137 Id. at 230.
138 Estate of Sinthasomphone by Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 878 F. Supp. 147,
152 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
139 Id.
140 See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
141 Kuiper, supra note 46, at 1231.
142 Id.
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about hedonic damages.143 This should lead courts to question whether
hedonic damages and the willingness-to-pay model have received the
requisite objective scrutiny necessary to reveal substantial flaws and
incorrect assumptions.144 Finally, hedonic damages “has received virtu-
ally no attention from members of the economics community at large.”145
Thus, the theory of hedonic damages has not been subjected to the scrutiny
and peer review envisioned by Daubert, and, therefore, testimony on
hedonic damages would likely not meet the requirement for peer review
and publication.
3. Known or Potential Error Rate
In addition to testability and peer review and publication, courts
consider the known or potential error rate of the theories or techniques
underlying proffered scientific evidence.146 Calculations on the value of
life based on the willingness-to-pay model have produced an enormous
range, with at least one study showing a range from zero dollars to over fif-
teen million dollars.147 This enormous range raises considerable questions
about the methodologies used in calculating hedonic damages and their
known or potential error rate. At least one court has found this range
unacceptably broad and, as a result, declined to admit hedonic damages
testimony.148 In Ayers v. Robinson, the district judge refused to admit the
testimony of Stan Smith, declaring his methodology to be a “simple eye-
balling technique.”149 Such a technique, the judge wrote, “may have the
advantage of ease, but it surely lacks scientific reliability in the sense of
producing consistent results.”150 Thus, it is unlikely that testimony on
hedonic damages is admissible given how unknown its error rate is.
Present calculations are, arguably, less important than no calcu-
lation at all. Only when the environment assumes a legal personage—as
do corporations, for example—will hedonic damages ever be an efficacious
tool for remediating environmental impairment. Absent such a legal rec-
ognition, Common Law Doctrines of Nuisance and Public Trust will re-
main the mainstays in the legal arsenal to safeguard the environment.
143 Id. at 1233.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 1234.
146 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
147 Ted R. Miller, The Plausible Range for the Value of Life—Red Herrings Among the
Mackerel, J. FORENSIC ECON. 17, 17 (1990).
148 Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F. Supp. 1049, 1060–62 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
149 Id. at 1060.
150 Id.
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Even though the majority of American jurisdictions have recog-
nized that the loss of enjoyment of life is a compensable injury,151 it is
highly unlikely that hedonic damages can serve as an effective remedy
for remedying environmental harms and degradations for two principal
reasons. First, it is unlikely that expert testimony on hedonic damages
can be considered “scientific knowledge” that will “assist the trier of fact”
under Daubert analysis.152 Furthermore, even if expert testimony on
hedonic damages were admissible, there is no viable method for comput-
ing hedonic damages for environmental harms. As discussed above, there
are numerous difficulties in computing the hedonic value of life by using
the willingness-to-pay model. Yet, the computation of the hedonic value
for environmental harm is even more speculative and subjective than
that for the loss of life.
For these reasons, state courts have increasingly declined to admit
expert testimony on hedonic damages.153 Indeed, one forensic economist
who has served as an expert witness on hedonic damages has stated has
that “[t]he period of time during which hedonic damage testimony has
been important in forensic economics is coming to an end”154 and that
only in New Mexico and Nevada does hedonic damages testimony still
stand a good chance of being admitted.155
II. RESTORATION DAMAGES
Many commentators have proposed restoration damages as an
objective and direct remedy for environmental harm.156 Restoration
damages could be applied for remediation or for losses of natural re-
sources and would be included in either equitable injunctive relief or
151 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT AC-
TIONS § 802 (1988). See Larry Bodine, Hedonic Damages Catch On,14 NAT’L L. J. 6, 27–28
(1992) (discussing the widening recognition of hedonic damages).
152 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94.
153 Thomas Ireland, The Last of Hedonic Damages: Nevada, New Mexico, and Running
a Bluff, 16 J. LEGAL ECON. 91, 95–96 (2009).
154 Id. at 99. Interestingly, many economists themselves are skeptical of their own ability—or
that of comparable experts—to actually quantify enjoyment. Collin Reed, The Marginal
Agent and Judicial Interpretation in The Marketplace, 30 CONN. L. REV. 647, 649–51 (1998).
155 Ireland, supra note 153, at 99. But see Economics discovers its feelings, supra note 47.
156 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117. See Susan Verdicchio, Envi-
ronmental Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 174–78 (1985) (discussing
the origins of restoration in the common law and its value as an environmental enforce-
ment tool).
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affirmative restorative injunctions.157 The Restatement prescribes the
damages for harm to land from a past invasion that does not result in a
total destruction of value to include compensation for “the difference
between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the
harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration
that has been or may be reasonably incurred . . . .”158 The comments to
the Restatement further elaborate this principle:
Even in the absence of value arising from personal use, the
reasonable cost of replacing the land in its original position
is ordinarily allowable as the measure of recovery . . . . If,
however, the cost of replacing the land in its original con-
dition is disproportionate to the diminution in the value of
the land caused by the trespass, unless there is a reason
personal to the owner for restoring the original condition,
damages are measured only by the difference between the
value of the land before and after the harm . . . . On the
other hand, if a building such as a homestead is used for
a purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordinarily
include an amount for repairs, even though this might be
greater than the entire value of the building.159
In addressing restoration damages, numerous courts have used
the principles set forth in the Restatement.160 However, decisions relying
on the Restatement have resulted in little of the consistency or predict-
ability that the Restatement authors intended “for the efficient allocation
of resources and the achievement of policy objectives.”161 The following
157 See Verdicchio, supra note 156, at 174. The real challenge in awarding damages for
environmental injuries is to shape the award in such a manner as to incentivize the re-
sponsibility of a defendant to abate and/or correct environmental injuries which have
occurred. Resolving this challenge may be accomplished by an award of temporary rather
than permanent damages. With this strategy, a defendant is subjected to “the threat of con-
tinued future suits unless the nuisance is redressed.” DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 5.7(4) (2d ed. 1993); see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive
Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998) (analyzing eco-
nomic theories of deterrence in the law of torts).
158 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1979).
159 Id. § 929(1) cmt. b.
160 See, e.g., Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1088–93 (Mont.
2007); Osborne v. Hurst, 947 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Alaska 1997); Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525
A.2d 287, 294 (N.J. 1987).
161 James R. Cox, Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award of Restoration Damages as
a Remedy for Environmental Torts, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 777, 781 (2003). Valuing
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sections will identify these areas of inconsistence in courts’ application
of the Restatement principles on restoration damages.
A. Diminution in Value or Restoration Damages?
The Restatement is surprisingly ambiguous concerning where an
award of restoration damages is appropriate. Section 929 of the Restate-
ment states that the “difference between the value of the land before the
harm and the value after the harm” shall be awarded for the loss of value
that results from the tortious conduct.162 Thus, the Restatement estab-
lishes a general rule that damages are to be measured based on the dim-
inution in value to the property. The Restatement then states that in
“appropriate case[s],” damages may be measured not on the diminution of
property value, but rather “the cost of restoration that has been or may be
reasonably incurred.”163 However, there is no guidance in the Restatement
about what constitutes an “appropriate case” and therefore commits the ap-
propriateness of restoration damages to the discretion of the trial court.164
The comment to this section states that when restoration damages
are “disproportionate to the diminution in the value of the land,” an award
of damages should be based on the diminution of value.165 The comment
then provides an ambiguous caveat—even when restoration damages are
disproportionate to the diminution of property value, they may still be
awarded if “there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the
original condition.”
Thus, the Restatement provides no bright-line rule for determin-
ing what is an “appropriate” case for an award of restoration damages,
except when restoration damages are disproportionate to the diminution
environmental harms can be undertaken by several methods: determining the value of
the environment as a commodity (use-value) and/or the value of the environment without
regard to market value (non-use value). See Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss
of Use Damage in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUM. J. ENTVL. L. 417, 420
(2005). A strict market based evaluation only appreciates the natural environment as but
a log in the economic machine. A recovery tied solely to a use-value basis is problematic
if it fails to capture “the full value of the harm done to resources.”See Frank B. Cross,
Natural Resource Damage Valuations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 341 (1989). In determining the
economic value of natural resources, environmental economists stress that the best mea-
sure of damages is the true value or replacement costs of the injured or destroyed resource.
Smith, supra note 34, at 730.
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a)(1979).
163 Id.
164 Id. § 929.
165 Id. § 929 (1) cmt. b.
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in property value.166 And yet even then, restoration damages can still be
awarded if “there is a reason personal to the owner.”167
This lack of a bright-line rule leaves trial courts with considerable
discretion in awarding restoration damages. And indeed, many state appel-
late courts have articulated a need for such discretion and declined to cre-
ate a bright-line rule.168 For example, in Board of County Commissioners
of Weld County v. Slovek, the Supreme Court of Colorado declined the
Court of Appeal’s invitation to create a bright-line rule governing the
plaintiff’s personal reason to seek restoration damages rather than diminu-
tion in property value.169 The case involved a county-owned gravel pit
from which water ran out and flooded the plaintiffs’ property.170 The trial
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that restoration damages should
be awarded, and based damages on the diminution in value of the dam-
aged property.171 The plaintiffs appealed and the Colorado Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and awarded restoration damages because
restoration damages would “more effectively return plaintiffs to the po-
sition they were in prior to the injury.”172
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the Colorado Court of
Appeals’ reversal.173 Notably, it declined to establish a bright-line rule
establishing the cost of restoration as the prima facie award of damages
where plaintiffs have a “personal reason” to seek restorative damages
rather than damages based on the diminution in property value:
We conclude, however, that the considerations governing
what is an “appropriate case” for departure from the market
value standard are not susceptible to reduction to a set list
and that no formula can be devised that will produce litmus-
test certainty and yet retain the flexibility to produce fair
results in all cases. Indeed, the cases reflect numerous
examples of efforts by courts to extricate themselves from
the bonds of rigid standards that yielded fair results in the
cases that gave them birth, but that lead to perceptibly
unjust consequences when applied to different facts. We
166 Id. § 929 (1)(a).
167 Id. § 929 (1) cmt. b.
168 Cox, supra note 161, at 782.
169 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1314 (Colo. 1986).
170 Id. at 1311–13.
171 Id. at 1312.
172 Slovek v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
173 Slovek, 723 P.2d at 1317.
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prefer to leave the selection of the appropriate measure of
damages in each case to the discretion of the trial court,
informed by the considerations previously discussed.174
Although the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision may be laudable
in that it gives trial courts discretion in determining the appropriate
measure for damages, its reluctance to establish a bright-line rule poses
considerable problems for cases involving environmental harm and deg-
radation. These cases typically involve significant, and often competing,
public policy interests. Failure to weigh competing interests and estab-
lish bright line rules determining when restoration damages are appro-
priate “leaves uncertainty in an area in which unpredictability is itself
a cost, as well as a barrier to cleanup and redevelopment.”175
Thus, both the Restatement and case law interpreting the Restate-
ment are unclear regarding when it is appropriate to award restorative
damages. This uncertainty and unpredictability reduces restorative dam-
ages effectiveness as a remedy for environmental harms.
B. Do Recipients of Restorative Damages Have an Obligation to
Clean Up?
Another impediment to a default rule awarding restorative damages
for environmental harm is the concern that the plaintiff will not use the
award to “clean up” the environmental harm. This concern often leads
courts to award damages based on the diminution of value even though
restorative damages would enable the plaintiff to repair the environmen-
tal harm more effectively than an award for the diminution in property
value.176 For example, the court in Roman Catholic Church of the Archdi-
ocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana Gas Servicing Company noted that
“reason to believe the plaintiff will, in fact, make the repairs” should be
a strong factor in determining whether to award restorative damages or
diminution in value damages.177
174 Id. at 1315–16 (citation omitted).
175 Cox, supra note 161, at 784.
176 Id. at 782.
177 Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of New Orleans v. La. Gas Serv. Co., 618 So.
2d 874 (La. 1993). In this case, the Archdiocese of New Orleans owned an apartment
complex that provided federally subsidized housing to two hundred low-income families.
Id. at 874. The defendant, Louisiana Gas Service Company, supplied natural gas to the
apartment units in the complex. Id. On December 24, 1983, equipment supplying the
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However, courts have a limited capacity in ascertaining whether
a plaintiff will in fact clean up.178 Moreover, there may be a strong mar-
ket disincentive to actually clean up the property after a plaintiff has been
awarded restorative damages. For example, consider an environmental
contamination where restoration costs greatly exceed the fair market
value of the damaged property and there has been no state or federal en-
forcement action. In this hypothetical, a willing buyer might purchase the
property for its positive value and take the risk that there will be no en-
forcement action. Thus, “there is a strong disincentive to actually effectu-
ate cleanup, and an incentive instead to simply sell the property to someone
who is willing to take the risk that cleanup may never be required.”179
This hypothetical raises a crucial problem for the effectiveness of
restorative damages as a remedy for environmental harm and degrada-
tion: if a plaintiff is awarded restorative damages for environmental harm
or degradation and there is no enforcement action or a third-party civil
suit brought by neighboring property owners to force the property owner
to cleanup his property, “how are the public’s interests, and those of future
property owners protected?”180 Moreover, the plaintiff has been enriched
unjustly, giving the property owner a windfall and resulting in an ineffi-
cient use of economic resources.
Some jurisdictions have statutory and regulatory schemes that
legally obligate property owners to restore the environment for certain
environmental contaminations. For instance, in Nischke v. Farmer & Mer-
chants Bank & Trust, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the ap-
propriate damages for plaintiffs whose property had been contaminated
from an underground gasoline tank.181 The court noted that under the
natural gas to the apartment units malfunctioned and flooded the apartment units with
dangerous amounts of gas, leading to a fire and other damages. Id.
178 Cox, supra note 161, at 784.
179 Importantly, courts may award restoration damages that exceed the diminution in market
value when justified under the personal reasons exception. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 929 (1) cmt. b (1979). However, significant controversy has emerged regarding when
the personal reasons exception may be invoked. All states that have considered this personal
reasons exception utilize a three-part test to determine if a landowner qualifies for it: “1)
Does the landowner have personal reasons for desiring restoration? 2) Is an award of resto-
ration damages likely to be spent on restoration? 3) Is the cost of restoration reasonable?”
Christopher E. Brown, Dump It Here, I Need the Money: Restoration Damages for Tempo-
rary Injury to Real Property Held for Personal Use, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 699, 713–14
(1996). However, states vary considerably in their application of this basic test. Id. at 714.
180 Cox, supra note 161, at 800.
181 Nischke v. Farmers & Merchants Banks & Trust, 522 N.W. 2d 542, 542 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994).
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Wisconsin state law, the plaintiff “has a duty as a landowner in possession
of discharged hazardous substances to take remedial measures to restore
the environment.”182 Thus the court was able to address its concern that the
plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if the state did not bring an enforce-
ment action to effectuate cleanup because the “[plaintiff’s] obligation to
take measures does not hinge upon the [state enforcement agency’s] case-
load or whether it has brought an enforcement action against her. Under
the statute and the code, Nischke is obligated to take these steps once
notified by the department.”183
Not all jurisdictions impose a duty on landowners to take reme-
dial measures to restore the environment.184 Furthermore, the scope of
statutory and regulatory schemes is limited and cannot encompass all
environmental harms and degradations.185
C. Equitable Trust
One way to safeguard the public interest and avoid the potentially
unjust enrichment of an awardee of restoration damages is through the
creation of a “constructive trust” or “equitable trust.” Such a trust could
be created for the benefit of current and future property owners, neighbors,
and the general public.186
In Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., Justice Cardozo de-
scribed a constructive trust as “the formula through which the conscience
of equity finds expression.”187 As Justice Cardozo writes, the very purpose
of a constructive or equitable trust is to prevent unjust enrichment: “[w]hen
property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the
legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest equity,
converts him into a trustee.”188
182 Id. at 551.
183 Id. at 552.
184 Cox, supra note 161, at 802.
185 For instance, see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (1980). CERCLA, which was enacted by
Congress on December 11, 1980, makes both current and former property owners jointly
and severally liable for the cleanup of contaminated property. However, this liability for
cleanup is limited to “hazardous materials” and the cleanup of “pollutants or contaminants.”
Id. § 9602. Notably, natural gas and petroleum are excluded from the definitions of these
three categories. Id. § 9601.
186 Cox, supra note 161, at 802.
187 Beatty v. Gugenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (citing Moore v.
Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889)).
188 Id.
90 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:65
Coupled with wider applications of equitable trust, principles
which would have the effect of guaranteeing orders for restoration damages
be used for specific purposes of restoring environmental integrity to dam-
aged segments of the environment—rather than serving as a source of
enrichment of plaintiffs—should be explored more fully.189 Yet, a power-
ful central caveat to such efforts is the realization that restoration can
often be more expensive than worthwhile and exceedingly protracted.190
D. Complexities in the Computation of Damages
The enormity of the challenge of computing and applying damages
to environmental degradations is seen dramatically in two paradigmatic
cases: Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Solocotroni191 and BP Exploration v. Lake
Eugenie Land and Development.192
In 1978, in Solocotroni, the U.S. Federal District Court gave judicial
deference sustaining the statutory right of the Puerto Rico Environmental
Quality Board to recover damages for harm caused by an oil spill of 1.5
million gallons for “the total value of the damages caused to the environ-
ment and/or natural resources”193 to an ecosystem in an isolated penin-
sula, Bahia Sucia, in the territorial waters of Puerto Rico.194 At the time
of the accident, there were no plans to develop the peninsula as it was
thought to have little value economically.195 While the actual cleanup
costs were set at $840,366.01, the total damages for harm to marine or-
ganisms was determined by the District Court to be $5,526,583.20;196
189 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117.
190 See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117. See also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(f)(4)(5) and 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1), which provide specifically for either restoration,
rehabilitation, replacement, or the acquisition of the equivalent natural resources when
they are damaged or destroyed.
191 Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), aff’d in part, 628
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980).
192 Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc. v. BP Exploration & Prod. (In re Deepwater Horizon),
732 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2013). For a case of significant note from the standpoint of the
damages awarded for an oil spill; see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). As
the consequence of a collision by the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan waters, damages were set
properly at 287 million dollars in compensatory damages and 5 million in punitive. See
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 122. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870 (1998)
(surveying the systems of economic incentive which act as a deterrence to acts seen as
socially injurious).
193 Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 1345 (quoting L.P.R.A. § 1131(29)(1977)).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Kevin T. Grady, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni: State Actions for
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when final restoration of costs were tallied, the damages were set at
$6,086,083.20.197 What gave this case landmark status was the court’s
recognition that a unique non-use environment had intrinsic value be-
cause of its own very existence.198
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, it was
determined—again—that damages would be sustained but that the frame-
work for determining fair and equitable damages would have to be reas-
sessed on remand.199 The central issue for the Appeals Court was how to
determine restorative costs when the “damaged area greatly exceeds the
ecological value of the damaged resources.”200 The more equitable envi-
ronmental approach would be to assess an amount of damages equal to
the value of the resources’ ecological or ecosystem worth.201 This ecosystem
approach, then, “rests on the economic value that the non-economical living
natural resources have to man.”202
When economically valuable natural resources of a state which
have a significant ecological value—but have neither commercial nor mar-
ket value—are injured, a computation should be made by the state of those
costs which it may be expected reasonably to incur in order to restore or
rehabilitate the environment of the affected area pre-ante.203 Alterna-
tively, a state could assess restorative damages “at the cost of acquiring
comparable lands for public parks, or alternative-site restoration.”204 Either
method of computation presents a unique set of challenges which can
properly be seen as almost insurmountable. The vectors of force at play in
any cost/benefit analysis here are colored by the perspectives—environ-
mental or socio-economic—of those advocating a point of equilibrium in
the environmental balancing necessary to determine restoration.
Damages to Non-Commercial Living Natural Resources, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV.
394, 417 (1980).
197 Id. at 417. For a further breakdown for the restorative damages sought, see id. at 398
n.25.
198 Id.
199 Colocotroni, 628 F.2d. at 652.
200 Grady, supra note 196, at 426.
201 Id. at 426–27.
202 Id. at 427. See also Kanner & Nagy, supra note 161. Although the standard of causation
in toxic tort law is complicated and contentious, it is asserted nevertheless that the toxic tort
doctrine (which essentially allows personal injury suits for harms caused by exposure to toxic
substances) could be an important guide to reforming environmental standing issues in en-
vironmental suits (or in cases that allege a plaintiff’s injury is due to a consequence of an
environmental harm or a direct violation of environmental statutes). Note, Causation in
Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2259, 2272 (2015).
203 Grady, supra note 196, at 428.
204 Id.
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The most recent Gulf Spill of 2010—termed the “worst offshore oil
spill in U.S. history”205—continues to spawn litigation which may well con-
tinue for decades.206 Presently, BP has expended, or set aside, some 42.97
billion dollars (including costs for litigation and settlement of 25.87
billion).207 The initial cleanup of the oil spill is now complete, but the after
effects continue to be monitored.208 Fines under the Clean Water Act for
this oil spill have yet to be determined by trial.209 Presently, fines have
been assessed at $3.51 billion, and as much as $18 billion may be im-
posed.210 Eighty percent of monies from the fund will be directed to envi-
ronmental restoration projects—with twenty percent placed in a trust
fund to cover cleanup costs which might accrue from future oil spills.211
On December 8, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an
appeal made by BP to the multi-billion-dollar settlement reached in 2012
upon a claim that it covers “business economic losses” which were unre-
lated to the actual Gulf disaster.212 BP has estimated that this part of the
settlement is costing 7.8 billion dollars and may well reach 10 billion.213
In sum, these two cases illustrate vividly, both the disruption—as
well as destruction—of evolved ecological communities.214 Indeed, as a
consequence of these environmental tragedies, the “existence value” of
205 Daniel Gilbert & Justin Scheck, Judge Hammers BP for Gulf Disaster, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 5, 2014, at B1.
206 Id.
207 Id. In order to settle five years of litigation over federal and state claims arising from
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill, BP agreed to pay $18.7 billion over the next 18 years
at a rate of $1.1 billion per year. This settlement does not, however, settle some 3,000
civil cases in both foreign and U.S. domestic courts. If approved by the federal court judge
hearing the case, this settlement would cost BP approximately $10 billion, in addition to
$44 billion incurred previously for legal and clean up costs. Daniel Gilbert & Sarah Kent,
BP to Pay Out $18.7 Billion to Settle Spill, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2015 at A1.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. Under the Clean Water Act, the maximum fine could have been assessed at $13.7
billion. Instead, BP will pay $5.5 billion, which would still be the largest fine levied under
this law. Gilbert & Kent, supra note 207.
211 Id.
212 Robert Barnes, Justices refuse to hear BP’s settlement challenge, WASH. POST, Dec. 9,
2014, at A3. See also BP Exploration v. Lake Eugenie Land & Dev., Inc., cert. denied, 574
U.S. Order List 14-123, Dec. 8, 2014. For a comparative analysis of how costs in
environmental litigation are assessed in English Law, see generally Gaytari Sarathy,
Costs in Environmental Litigation: Venn v. Secretary of the State for Communities and
Local Government, 27 J. ENVTL. L. 313 (2015).
213 Barnes, supra note 212.
214 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 135.
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“wildlife and their ecological pyramid is [simply] gone.”215 Rather than
utilize ex post analysis, ex ante management action—as will be seen, by
specific use of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance and the Public Trust—
is the most environmentally sound approach to pursue.
III. PARENS PATRIAE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
The doctrine of parens patriae, or “parent of the country,” origi-
nated in the common law and was rooted in the king’s guardianship of
his people.216 In American common law, the doctrine of parens patriae
gives a state standing to seek injunctive relief or resource damages when
it can demonstrate a direct interest in the resource.217 This doctrine is
based both on the state’s guardianship of common resources and its
sovereign interest in the welfare of its citizens.218
Traditionally, states were required to meet the same standing re-
quirements as individuals when exercising their parens patriae powers.
However, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachu-
setts v. E.P.A.,219 these standing requirements for states have been sig-
nificantly diminished.
The doctrine of standing places limits on the cases that can come
before the courts and there are three requirements: (1) the plaintiff must
have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2) there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of and (3) it must be
likely that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.220
In its landmark decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme
Court addressed the difficult question of standing in environmental law-
suits.221 The case arose when the United States National Forest Service
215 Id.
216 George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Ty-
rant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896 (1976).
217 Id. Inasmuch as the state is not solely advancing the rights of injured citizens by
exercising its parens patriae powers, but additionally expressing a sovereign or quasi-
sovereign interest, standing is deemed appropriate. A further justification for following
parens patriae standing is found when there is a widespread injury to a significant number
of citizens which cannot be computed monetarily. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & VIKRAAM DAVID AMAR, 17 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 4047
(3d ed. 2007). Interestingly, in the past, there has been difficulty distinguishing “true”
parens patriae suits from ordinary class actions. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW AND WATER
RIGHTS & RESOURCES § 10.12 (2007).
218 Curtis, supra note 216, at 907.
219 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
220 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
221 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
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permitted the development of a ski resort and summer recreation area
in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest.222 The envi-
ronmental advocacy group Sierra Club sought a permanent injunction to
prevent the National Forest Service from permitting the development
project and the question on appeal to the United States Supreme Court
was whether the Sierra Club had standing to sue.223
In its complaint, the Sierra Club alleged that the development of
the Mineral King Valley “would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the
scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would
impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations.”224 The Court
agreed with Sierra Club that the harm resulting from the development
of Mineral King Valley constituted an injury-in-fact sufficient to demon-
strate standing and noted that “the fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.225
However, the Court noted that an organization seeking to represent these
public interests must demonstrate that its members are among the in-
jured.226 Because the Sierra Club had not asserted in its complaint that
any of its members had visited Mineral King Valley and therefore articu-
lated no individualized harm to itself or its members, the Court held it
lacked standing to maintain its action and affirmed the Court of Appeals
dismissal of the District Court’s preliminary injunction.227
Sierra Club v. Morton is perhaps best known for Justice Douglas’
dissenting opinion in which he argued that natural resources ought to have
standing to sue for their own protection.228 Drawing on Christopher Stone’s
eponymous landmark article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward
Legal Rights for Natural Objects,229 Douglas argued that legal standing
222 Id. at 734–35.
223 Id. at 730–33.
224 Id. at 734.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741.
228 Id. at 741–44.
229 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 450 (1972). Stone proposed conferring legal rights not only
to “natural objects” within the environment (e.g., forests, oceans, rivers, etc.), but to the
natural environment as a whole. Accordingly, when perceived by a friend of a natural
object, that the environment was endangered, an application could be made to court to
create a guardianship for the threatened environmental object. Id. Recovering for natural
resource damages “is conceptually similar to the tort law doctrine of providing a sum of
money ‘to make the victim whole again’ although here the victim is the environment
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for the environment was necessary for its own preservation. The problem,
Douglas argued, is that although the natural resources that are “the core
of America’s beauty” are, for the most part, under the protection of federal
and state agencies, there is enormous pressure from industry to not safe-
guard these resources for the common good.
The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or cor-
rupt. But they are notoriously under the control of powerful
interests who manipulate them through advisory commit-
tees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural
affinity with the agency which in time develops between
the regulator and the regulated.230
Despite questioning the agencies’ ability to exercise their regula-
tory authority on behalf of the public interest and not the industries they
regulate, Douglas insisted that he was not calling for the judiciary to
replace the federal agencies’ management of natural resources.231 The
judiciary’s role, he wrote, is simply to let the voice of these environmental
wonders be heard.232
Although the Sierra Club lost its appeal, it was ultimately suc-
cessful in preventing the commercial development of the Mineral King
Valley. In 1978, Congress passed the National Parks and Recreation Act,
which made the Mineral King Valley a part of the Sequoia National Park
and thereby thwarted private plans for its commercial development.233
The legacy of Sierra Club v. Morton has grown stronger over the
years. More recently, in 2007 in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., the Supreme
Court took a decisive step in widening heretofore heavy standing require-
ments for the states, under their parens patriae powers, to litigate climate-
related injuries.234 The case arose when states, local governments, and
environmental organizations petitioned for a review of an order of the
rather than a private party.” Jason J. Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-
Use Values in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509,
509–10 (2005) (quoting Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing
the Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851, 875 (1989)).
230 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 746 (1972).
231 Id. at 749–50.
232 Id. at 750.
233 National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 314, 92 Stat. 3467,
3479 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 451 (1994)).
234 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) denying a petition for rulemak-
ing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
the Clean Air Act.235 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit denied the petition and upheld the EPA’s decision,
although the courts’ judges differed significantly over their reasoning in
reaching their decision, and the question of whether the petitioners had
standing was contested.236
The group of states,237 local governments,238 and private organi-
zations239 filed a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court and it was
granted.240 The principal disagreement among the justices was whether
establishing a general harm and a quasi-sovereign injury under the doc-
trine of parens patriae raises or lowers a state’s standing requirements.241
Writing for the majority in its decision finding that Massachusetts had
met the standing requirement, Justice Stevens concluded that the stand-
ing requirements for states were lessened.242 First, Justice Stevens noted
that Congress enjoined the EPA to protect the states’ citizens from environ-
mental harms and created a remedy for a party whose petition to the EPA
is denied. This procedural right, he argued, coupled with “Massachusetts’
stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests” entitles the Common-
wealth to a “special solicitude in our standing analysis.”243
In his opinion, Justice Breyer relied heavily on the Court’s 1907 de-
cision in Georgia v. Tennessee Cooper,244 a case in which Georgia sought to
protect its citizens from out-of-state pollution and in which the Court held
its interest in the land and air of the state qualified as a quasi-sovereign
interest, and quoted from it at length:
235 Id. at 498.
236 Mass. v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
237 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505 n.2 (listing state plaintiffs: California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington).
238 Id. at 505 n.3 (listing local government plaintiffs: District of Columbia, American
Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore).
239 Id. at 505 n.3 (listing private organization plaintiffs: Center for Biological Diversity,
Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environ-
mental Defense, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, International Center for Technology
Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra
Club, Union of Concerned Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
240 Id. at 506.
241 Id. at 519–38.
242 Id. at 498.
243 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 498.
244 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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The case has been argued largely as if it were one between
two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that
would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as
a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The State
owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and
the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at
least, is small. This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in
its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has
the last word as to whether its mounts shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.245
If Georgia had a quasi-sovereign interest in its air, Stevens reasoned,
Massachusetts also had a quasi-sovereign interest in its territory and
therefore the right as parens patriae to challenge the EPA’s refusal to
regulate greenhouses gas emissions from new cars.246
Notably, Stevens failed to distinguish between the standing rights
granted to Massachusetts through the doctrine of parens patriae and the
specific procedural rights conferred in the Clean Air Act to challenge the
EPA’s decision to reject the plaintiff’s rulemaking request.247 Because the
Court did not clarify to what extent Massachusetts’ special standing
rested on the doctrine of parens patriae as opposed to procedural rights
granted by the Clean Air Act, it is difficult for lower courts to determine
precisely what standing requirements states must meet when initiating
a claim as parens patriae.
A. Chief Justice Robert’s Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts made two princi-
pal criticisms of the majority’s opinion. First, he argued that the doctrine
of parens patriae does not provide states with greater standing rights.248
Second, he argued that the plaintiffs’ claim was a nonjusticiable issue
that would be better resolved by the political branches.
245 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519 (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907)).
246 Id.
247 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2012); Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519–20.
248 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 537–38.
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B. Parens Patriae Does Not Provide States with Greater
Standing Rights
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority sidestepped the
traditional three-part test of standing by simply declaring that states are
entitled to “special solicitude,” even though neither the Court’s jurispru-
dence nor the Clean Air Act made a distinction between public and private
litigants, let alone permitted relaxed standing requirements for states.249
Although Roberts conceded that Tennessee Copper did draw a distinction
between a state and private litigants, it was “solely with respect to avail-
able remedies. The case had nothing to do with Article III standing.”250
Moreover, rather than being a substitute for Article III injury, “parens
patriae actions raise an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articu-
lation of a ‘quasi-sovereign interest’ apart from the interests of particular
private parties.”251 According to Chief Justice Roberts, “focusing on Mas-
sachusetts’ interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required showing
harder, not easier” because “a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests
as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III.”252
Thus Chief Justice Roberts asserted that “the status of Massachusetts
as a State cannot compensate for [its] failure to demonstrate injury in
fact, causation, and redressability” and, therefore, under traditional stand-
ing requirement analysis, the case should be dismissed.253
Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent by noting that the petition-
ers were “apparently dissatisfied with the pace of progress” by Congress
and the President in addressing global climate change and therefore ‘came
to the courts’ to address their injury.254 By recognizing Massachusetts’
standing in a case replete with such significant and competing policy
interests affecting not only the nation but the entire world, the majority,
Roberts argued, led the court into policy decisions that are only appropri-
ate for the political branches, i.e., Congress and the Executive.255 “The
249 Id. at 535–38.
250 Id. at 537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts is technically correct because the Court
did not develop the modern standing doctrine until the 1940s, several decades after the
Tennessee Cooper decision. See Bradford C. Mank, No Article III Standing for Private
Plaintiffs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas Regulations: The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1543 (2014).
251 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
252 Id. at 537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
254 Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 548–49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Constitutional role of the courts,” Roberts writes, “[ ] is to decide concrete
cases—not to serve as a convenient forum for policy debates.” Moreover,
this lax application of the standing doctrine causes the Court to violate
the separation of powers, which “is crucial in maintaining the tripartite
allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.”256
C. Public Trust
The public trust doctrine has its origins in Roman law and has
roots in American jurisprudence since at least 1810.257 The doctrine orig-
inally developed around the rights of the public with respect to tidelands
and navigable waters.258 In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax authored a land-
mark law review article calling for the public trust doctrine to be utilized
as an effective tool for environmental protection.259 In his seminal article,
Professor Sax proposed that some natural resources—oceans, other bodies
of water, shorelines, the air, and portions of land—be treated by courts
as a “public trust” and that citizens have a right to sue to protect them
against government, business, and private individuals who might threaten
them.260 Sax’s article was enormously influential and transformed the
public trust from a doctrine of public rights in waterways and tidal lands
to a doctrine protecting natural resources.
Today, the public trust doctrine is rooted in state law and states
have variously enshrined the doctrine in constitutions, statutes, and com-
mon law.261 Thus, responsibility for some of the country’s most important
natural resources resides in state legislatures, state courts, and state
coastal and land commissions,262 and state public trust doctrines vary
considerably in terms of their “robustness and breadth.”263 The Supreme
256 Id. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 340–41 (2006)).
257 Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
1437, 1438 (2013).
258 Id. at 1438–39.
259 See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1970).
260 Id. But see Hope Babcock, Is Protecting the Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Jus-
tifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015) (analyzing the over-reach of the Public
Trust Doctrine).
261 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1439. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980).
262 Julia B. Wyman, In States We Trust: The Importance of the Preservation of the Public
Trust Doctrine in the Wake of Climate Change, 35 VT. L. REV. 507 (2010).
263 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1439. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni,
456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), aff’d in part, 628 F. 2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), where the
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Court itself has recognized the need for states to have considerable lati-
tude in applying this doctrine “according to [their] own view of justice
and policy,” noting that “great caution . . . is necessary in applying prec-
edents in one State to cases arising in another.”264
In 1892, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, and declared that states
have a duty to protect their natural resources for the benefit of their people
and the promotion of the common good.265 The case involved whether the
Illinois legislature could repeal an earlier law conveying ownership of a
significant portion of the bed of the Chicago harbor to Illinois Central
Railroad, a private company.266 The Circuit Court of the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois upheld the legislature’s revocation of the conveyance and
the railroad appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s de-
cision and held that because the state owned the bed of the Chicago
harbor in trust for the people, it could not transfer the lands to a private
corporation if the conveyance violated the public trust and was not in the
best interests of the people.267
Thus Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois established two important
principles governing states’ stewardship of natural resources: (1) states
must regulate the use of some natural resources, such as rivers and other
navigable waterways, “in a sovereign capacity” and (2) states must exer-
cise this power only for the benefit of the public and the common good.268
To this day, the case remains “[t]he most celebrated public trust case in
American law.”269
In its modern form, the public trust doctrine imposes three re-
strictions on governmental activity: (1) the property subject to the trust
must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held for use by
the general public, (2) the property may not be sold, even for fair-market
value, and (3) the property must be maintained for particular types of
uses.270
government acted within its parens patriae powers as trustee of the public trust in as-
sessing restorative damages for a peninsula in Puerto Rico equal to the value of the re-
sources within the particular ecosystem that was damaged by an oil spill. See also Grady,
supra note 196, at 398 nn.25–28.
264 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
265 Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
266 Id. at 452.
267 Id.; see Babock, supra note 260.
268 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1450.
269 Sax, supra note 259, at 489.
270 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36.
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D. State Ownership of Wildlife
The public trust doctrine coupled with the state’s sovereign own-
ership of wildlife and recognition of the wildlife as a public trust resource
is an effective means to address environmental harms and degradations.271
In light of changing social and legal circumstances, the scope of the pub-
lic trust doctrine has been expanded to many other natural resources,
including wildlife. The state sovereign ownership of wildlife also has its
origins in Roman civil law and has roots in American jurisprudence from
the early nineteenth century.272
In 1896, the Supreme Court affirmed states’ sovereign ownership
of wildlife in Geer v. State of Connecticut.273 In this case, the State of Con-
necticut charged Edward Geer with possessing wild birds with the intent
to transport them across state lines.274 Although Geer had lawfully killed
the birds during hunting season, a state statute forbade transporting the
game across state lines.275 Geer was found guilty of violating the statute
and was fined.276 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the question was
whether the state statute forbidding the transport of lawfully killed game
to another state was permissible.277 In its decision upholding the state
statute, the Court traced the history of states’ sovereign ownership of wild-
life and found that judicial recognition of this authority was widespread.278
The Court also noted the purpose of this ownership, writing that:
This common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other
powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the
people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of the
government as distinct from the people, or for the benefit
of private individuals as distinguished from public good.279
The court noted that the state’s ownership of the wildlife is “that of
the people in their united sovereignty” and therefore the state must take
responsibility of this natural resource and exercise its sovereign ownership
271 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1451.
272 Id. at 1450.
273 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
274 Id. at 519–20.
275 Id. at 519, 521.
276 Id. at 520.
277 Id. at 522.
278 Id. at 528.
279 Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.
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of the wildlife for the benefit of the people.280 Thus the Supreme Court af-
firmed states’ sovereign ownership of wildlife and “indicated that the au-
thority to ensure conservation of wildlife is inherent in state ownership.”281
State sovereign ownership of wildlife is now widely recognized and
at least forty-eight states claim ownership of wildlife.282 Moreover, it is
now firmly established that the federal government also has a significant
role in protecting wildlife as a natural resource. The Court first established
the federal government’s right to regulate wildlife in its 1920 decision in
Missouri v. Holland.283 In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was a valid exercise of federal power.284
The State of Missouri argued that it violated the Tenth Amendment, but
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority, wrote that the
State “may regulate the killing and sale of such bird, but it does not follow
that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers.”285 Thus, Missouri
v. Holland affirmed the state sovereign ownership of wildlife while also
establishing the federal government’s right to regulate wildlife.
Although subsequent cases have limited states’ power over wild-
life vis-a-vis the federal government, state sovereign ownership of wild-
life has not diminished in importance.286 And indeed many commentators
over the past two decades have called for states’ sovereign ownership of
wildlife to play a larger role in conversation efforts by way of recognizing
wildlife as a public trust resource.287
Changing public “needs” have been the reason or, as the case may
be, the excuse, for capacious overreach and enforcement of the Public
Trust Doctrine.288 Judicial enforcement and implementation of this Doctrine
must be temporal and measured—at all times—by the common good.289
280 Id.
281 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1460. Interestingly, some forty-eight states have
already effected a merger of the English Common Law notion of sovereign ownership of
wildlife with the Public Trust Doctrine. Id. at 1487.
282 Id. at 1462 n.204. For a complete chart of state sovereign ownership of wildlife and
state wildlife trusts, see id. at 1488–1504.
283 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 434.
286 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257, at 1461.
287 See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I):
Applying Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO
L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2000).
288 Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36, at 308. See Babcock, supra note 260.
289 Often the courts have used the public trust powers under the Doctrine to overturn legis-
lative actions viewed as inconsistent with it. Baton H. Thompson, The Public Trust Doctrine:
A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L. J. 47, 55 (2006).
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Accordingly, the use of public trust preservation powers should be bal-
anced by an understanding of “the legitimate expectations and real in-
terests of individual property owners with the need for enhanced public
resource presentation.”290 Normally, “the legitimate economic interests
of the property owner” should prevail over the felt needs to widen the scope
of environmental protection.291
IV. COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM IN ACTION
The federal government owns lands in the United States constitut-
ing roughly one-third of the Nation.292 This, in turn, translates into owner-
ship of approximately 740 million acres of land of which some 440 million
are “disposable” administratively, without prior congressional approval.293
In May 2014, President Obama exercised his unilateral power
under the Antiquities Act of 1906294 to set aside some 500,000 acres in
New Mexico along the border to Mexico to be preserved as a national mon-
ument.295 Boasting that during his administration he has preserved over
three million acres of public lands for the future, the President acknowl-
edged that he planned to act to protect even more land.296
A. Land Trusts and Conservation Easements
Since 1891, in America, land trusts—also termed land conservan-
cies and conservation land trusts—have been in existence.297 Often part-
nered with local governments, these trusts, which are nonprofit, identify
with important, and often fragile, ecosystems and seek—as such—to ensure
290 Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36, at 309.
291 Id.
292 DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAND USE 1051 (6th ed. 2012).
293 Id. The major exceptions to this right of disposition are the lands in national parks,
the national forests and the national wildlife refuges. Id. Of this total acreage of 740 mil-
lion, one authority asserts 662 million acres are under actual control by the federal gov-
ernment with their management delegated to the Bureaus of Land Management and
Indian Affairs, as well as the National Park Service in the Department of Interior. THOMAS
W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 129 (2d ed. 2012).
294 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433.
295 Erika Johnsen, Obama administration designates another half million acres in New




297 See generally R. BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003).
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that permanent protections are in place to allow municipalities to pre-
serve critical environmental areas as comprehensive plans,298 together
with land use approvals laid out by local governmental units and the
acquisition of conservation easements.299 Nationwide, thirty-seven million
acres of land have been conserved by land trusts.300
Designed to preserve the natural resources of land or, alternatively,
the public values inherent in land, conservation easements are seen as legal
agreements entered into by a property owner and either a municipal
government, a land trust, or other qualified organizations.301 Enforced by
local governments, land trusts, or other organizations, this easement oper-
ates essentially as a restrictive covenant which has the effect of burden-
ing an owner’s use of land.302 The effect of this type of easement is to limit
those land activities which compromise either conservation or environ-
mental values and management.303 Conservation easements vary widely
depending upon not only the nature of the property but, as well, the desires
of the owner or the interest of the organization holding the easement.304 In
Texas, interestingly, more than thirteen million private acres have conser-
vation easements managed by the State Parks and Wildlife Department.305
Commendable as these combined efforts at safeguarding the envi-
ronment are, the glaring weakness with the present national land use
and environmental “legal system” is that its continued adherence to “its
dated standards and many disconnections fall far short of a cogent frame-
work of laws.”306 Lacking consistency in policymaking at the municipal,
state, and federal levels of government underscores the strength and vital-
ity of the common law as the framework for principled environmental
decision-making.
298 NOLON, supra note 20.
299 Id. See generally ELIZABETH & KARIN M. PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HAND-
BOOK (2005).
300 See Landtrust Alliance, Landtrust Alliance Annual Report 2014, http://www.landtrust
alliance.org/about/annual-report [http://perma.cc/XSQ7-GY7K] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
Interestingly, in Wisconsin alone, over 100,000 acres of land are protected by some fifty
land trusts. NOLON, supra note 20, at 202.
301 NOLON, supra note 20, at 202. See generally Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements:
Designer Flaws, Enforcement Challenges and Reform, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 69 (2013)
(discussing the strengths and weaknesses of conservation easements).
302 NOLON, supra note 20.
303 Id.
304 Id. See generally Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditures: In
Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2012) (analyzing the tax values
of conservation easements).
305 TEX. NATURAL RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001–183.006 (West 2014).
306 NOLON, supra note 20, at 255.
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V. THE LAW OF NUISANCE AND THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Nuisance, Sections 822, 827,
and 828 (1979) present a workable construct for assessing the extent to
which unreasonable conduct gives rise to liability.
Section 822 provides:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only
if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the
invasion is either
(a) intention and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for
abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.307
In determining the gravity of the harm and the social value of
activity allegedly causing injury, Sections 827 and 828 of the Restatement
list a number of factors to be considered as:
(a) the extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved;
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use
or enjoyment involved;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment in-
vaded to the character of the locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.308
The “utility of conduct” balancing factors are listed in Section 828
as:
(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary
purpose of the conduct;
(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the
locality; and preventing or avoiding the invasion.309
Typically, three alternatives to the Restatement of Torts template
for testing the bounds of reasonable conduct are listed as being:
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
308 Id. § 827.
309 Id. § 828.
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1. Determining whether—consistent with the English
Common Law—a defendant’s conduct has either
caused or threatened to cause an invasion of plain-
tiff’s land (e.g., released particles polluting the air
or sewage into a stream).310
2. Application of a relevant community’s general un-
derstanding of what “normal land uses” include.311
3. Determining whether the actions of parties—plain-
tiff and/or defendant—are consistent with the norms
of “neighborliness” within a particular community.312
Obviously, all three of these alternatives are exceedingly broad
and rather open-ended. Testing the bounds of normative conduct using
these “standards” is, indeed, problematic. The decided advantage that
the Restatement of Torts enjoys over these alternatives is that specific
behavioral and economic factors are enumerated and thereby provide a
framework for the judiciary to test the parameters of legally acceptable
(e.g., reasonable) conduct.
The strength of the Restatement’s position on nuisance is both for-
tified and sustained by the body of the Common Law and its established
historical capacity to adapt to the changing conditions of differences.
Indeed, the Common Law system affords more flexibility to integrate
“public civic values into new and significant settings” than inflexible
statutory directives.313
A. Anticipatory Nuisance
One of the most significant legal tools to manage the environment
before an actual injury to it occurs is through the equitable injunctive
remedy of anticipatory nuisance.314 Obviously, it is better to address
310 Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (1979).
311 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729–30 (1973).
312 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28–29
(University Casebook Series ed., 2d ed. 2012).
313 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 57, 90.
314 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY 63 (Little, Brown & Co. ed., 2d
ed. 1956). See Serena M. Williams, The Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine: One Common Law
Theory for Use in Environmental Justice Cases, 19 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
223, 224, 239 (1995) (analyzing the practicality of the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance
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environmental issues Ex Ante or, before conflicts arrive over resource use
and allocations, rather than follow Ex Post analysis which is undertaken
subsequent to the when improper or unreasonable use of the environ-
ment occurs.315 Inasmuch as most legal controversies are presented to the
judiciary for ex post analysis, the courts—of necessity—are drawn natu-
rally to this analytical method.316 Regardless of which analytical construct
is used to remediate environmental injuries, the courts always seek a
“solution that makes the most sense and is both efficient and fair.”317
When a moving party seeks to prevent threatening conduct which
will subsequently become a nuisance, an action in equity for prohibitory
injunction will lie for an anticipatory nuisance.318 Long recognized in both
state319 and federal common law,320 an action for anticipatory nuisance
is largely under-utilized321—this, because of a high burden of proof (usually
reasonable certainty or a high probability of injury) being required leg-
islatively322 or through practice and interpretation judicially.323 Seen as
despotic324 because it conflicts with the founding principle of Common
as a deterrent to the siting of waste facilities in local communities); Thomas W. Merrill,
Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1675–76 (2015) (acknowledging
anticipatory relief—either in the form of declaratory judgment or otherwise—should not
be used extensively, but concluding such relief may have real value in those cases where
requiring property owners to seek compensation results in “incomplete, impractical, or
inefficient outcomes”).
315 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 312, at 60.
316 Id. at 64.
317 Id. Interestingly, it has been posited that the Second Amendment to the Constitution
is best studied through the law of nuisance because the central concern of both is tied to
one common question: “whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the
loss which would be suffered as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm.”
Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 951, 959
(2011) (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1960)).
318 Smith, supra note 34, at 688.
319 See generally Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1988) (presenting a
historical consideration of the doctrine’s use in state and federal courts).
320 See Smith, supra note 34, at 722–23 n.257 (citing Cal. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency
v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181, 181 (9th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
321 Smith, supra note 34, at 696.
322 Alabama and Georgia are the only states that have legislated recognition of the legal ac-
tion of anticipated nuisance. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-2-14 (1991).
323 See e.g., Fisk v. Bd. of Trs., 218 N.E. 2d 240, 244 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966), quoted in Vill. of
Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E. 2d 824, 836 (Ill. 1981).
324 Charles J. Doane, Comment, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern Doctrine in Antici-
patory Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Harm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
441, 452 (1990).
108 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:65
Law nuisance, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas325 and thus prevents
landowners from utilizing their real property as they deem reasonable,326
the action for anticipatory nuisance is not only efficacious but a valuable
tool for preventing ex post despoliation of the environment.
B. Aesthetic Nuisance
While traditionally, equity protected only actual property rights
“or rights of substance in the nature of property rights,” thereby exclud-
ing personal or individual rights from protection, the continuing modern
trend extends equitable relief to protect existing personal rights which
are judicially cognizable.327 One such personal “right” which is indeed be-
coming more recognized as a right rather than an interest, is that of
aesthetics. Accordingly, injury to aesthetic interests is defined, simply,
as an injury suffered due to a compromise to the visual environment.328
No distinction is made between either “obstruction of view” and “unrea-
sonable appearance.”329
Within the context of land use and zoning, all of the state courts
have begun to address the pressing issue of when and whether aesthetic
considerations may be recognized as legitimate bases for exercising regu-
latory police powers.330 Some twenty-three states permit regulatory ac-
tions based purely on aesthetics.331 Others allow for aesthetic regulation
when they are combined with additional factors such as historic preser-
vation, community character, tourism, and traffic safety.332 The totality
325 Coquillette, supra note 39, at 772.
326 See Smith, supra note 34, at 680.
327 DE FUNIAK, supra note 314, at 10.
328 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 54 n.10. See also DE FUNIAK, supra note 314,
at 124–25.
329 But cf. Frank Michaelman, Toward a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, 15
PRAC. LAW. 36, 37 (1969).
330 CALLIES ET AL., supra note 292, at 70. See generally Meg Stevenson, Aesthetic
Regulations: A History, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 519 (2007) (tracing the development of aesthetic
land use controls). See also Babcock, supra note 260.
331 CALLIES ET AL., supra note 292, at 74.
332 Id. Other issues of aesthetic control are directed toward billboards and other signs,
house size and McMansions. Id. at 76, 576–77. For a state by state analysis of legal aes-
thetics, see generally Kenneth Pearlman, Elizabeth Linville, Andrea Phillips & Erin Prosser,
Beyond the Eye of the Beholder Once Again: A New Review of Aesthetic Regulation, 38 URB.
LAW. 119 (2006). See generally Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood
Conservation Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L.J. 1525 (2015) (analyzing
how conservation districts serve negatively as sources for regulating aesthetics).
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of response to aesthetic zoning shows, beyond doubt, the value which so-
ciety is now placing upon aesthetic balance and preservation.333
In evaluating cases of aesthetic nuisance, courts employ—of ne-
cessity—“the very same analysis that they have been doing for many years
in aural and olfactory nuisance cases.”334 Accordingly, the controlling issue
is whether “normal persons living in the area or community would regard
the defendant’s land use as a substantial interference with their use and
enjoyment of land . . . ?”335 Of precedential necessity, the objective stan-
dard for determining this question is what the average, ordinary, reason-
able person would hold under the given facts.336
By using an economic metric for evaluating the aesthetic injury
caused, a court can rather easily determine whether the questioned conduct
constitutes a substantial and unreasonable interference.337 Accordingly,
if the presence of an unsightly activity devalues the fair market value of
a landowner’s property, the conduct is a nuisance—this, simply because
a substantial and unreasonable interference has occurred. If the activity
cannot be enjoined, the landowner should be entitled to damages which
reflect the devaluation of his property.338 In order to determine whether
a land use is unsightly, and thus unreasonable, the courts will consider
initially, the visual environment as a whole339 including the “socio-cultural
identity of the particular neighborhood.”340 Accordingly, what one commu-
nity finds pleasing aesthetically, another community with differing stan-
dards may find unsightly.341
C. Assessing Panoramic Views
A 270-degree panoramic view of the New England high county—in-
cluding the peaks of Mt. Ascutney—“the reddening leaves and white-painted
333 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 83. See Raymond Coletta, The Case for Aesthetic
Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141 (1987) (proposing rea-
sons for wider acceptance of aesthetic nuisance law); see also Note, Aesthetic Nuisance:
An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970) (discussing the emergence
of actions for aesthetic nuisance). See generally Lemar, supra note 332.
334 George P. Smith, II, Aesthetic Nuisance: Re-educating the Judiciary, 24 REAL EST. L.
J. 26, 31 (1995) [hereinafter Aesthetic Nuisance].
335 Coletta, supra note 333, at 161.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 DOBBS, supra note 157, § 5.7(3). See Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 75 (discussing
how market forces serve as an objective factor of aesthetic value).
339 Coletta, supra note 333, at 157.
340 Id. “Unsightliness is, in essence a conclusion that the visual form is incongruous with
the existing, sociocultural matrix.” Id.
341 Id. See also State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
110 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:65
houses of the Connecticut River valley” and sometimes “migratory geese
cruising by at eye level” has, in Plainfield, New Hampshire, been valued,
for purposes of real estate taxation, as worth $237,265.00. This valuation
resulted in an assessment of actual property taxes of approximately
$4,700.00.342
“View factors” are, for tax assessors, very subjective. But, in a
state like New Hampshire where there are no sales taxes nor a personal
income tax, vistas are a crucial source of revenue.343 One assessor ob-
served that from 1995 to 2005, the maximum assessed value of proper-
ties with scenic view “jumped from a maximum of around $20,000 to
$200,000.00 or more. . . .”344
Even with the benefit of a VIEW MANUAL, which, as such, illustrates
a range of vistas ranging from average to grand, substantive evidentiary
proofs to validate real assessments are lacking.345 Indeed, the tax assessor
for the town of Conway, New Hampshire, acknowledged his standard for
assessing vistas was more or less intuitive.346
A property view rated as “300” whose view was of a barn and a
mountain which yielded “a little bit of the horizon” tripled the property
valuation by $96,000.00. Similarly, a ninety-degree view of a river and
hills are normally assessed at a higher value than only hills.347
It is thus seen that contemporary real estate appraisal techniques
routinely place economic valuations to aesthetic considerations.348 And,
this practice furthermore—seen as rather “subjective” at least in New
Hampshire—even with the benefit of a VIEW MANUAL—is properly rooted
in the Common Law; for, historically, aural and olfactory offenses were
recognized as nuisances even though unequivocal legal standards for
their assessment were lacking.349 Rather than being constrained by an
342 David A. Fahrenthold, N.H. Puts a Price on Panoramas: Property Taxes Soar, WASH.
POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A1.
343 Id.
344 STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, RESOURCES FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE RESIDENTS—TAXES
(2012), http://www.nh.gov/residents/taxes.html [http://perma.cc/NG35-Y5M3].
345 Id.
346 Id. The Assessor related that he knows an evaluation/assessment “when I see it.” Id.
347 See generally Stephen Sussna, Is The View Worth It?, APPRAISAL DIG., Winter 1964,
at 22–24 (stressing the need for zoning to serve the present-day goal of visual beauty).
348 Aesthetic Nuisance, supra note 334, at 32. The sales comparison approach is best
suited for aesthetic evaluations. Under it, a “valuation is based on the economic principle
that a prudent purchaser will not pay more for a property than the price of an equally
desirable substitute property would bring in the open market at that approximate point
in time.” Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 75–76. The “income approach” and the
“cost approach” are the two other real estate appraisals for aesthetic evaluations. Id.
349 Aesthetic Nuisance, supra note 334, at 31.
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absence of strict standards of objectivity in calculating aesthetic harms,
then, through aesthetic zoning350 and use of the sensibilities of the average
ordinary person and/or community in testing the extent of unreasonable
conduct by a defendant, judicial determinations are undertaken.351
D. Of Birds and Trees
A unique case where aesthetic anticipatory nuisances occurred in
tandem in Loudon, Virginia, occurred in 1999.352 There, in order to pre-
vent 224,000 black birds and their work “products” from creating nuisance
in a new housing development, a land developer cut down twenty-eight
acres of trees which were inhabited by the birds.353 It was determined that
no rules had been violated by the developer when the tree acreage was
decimated, even though the birds went by several hundred yards into yet
another subdivision.354 Inasmuch as the birds would migrate North in
March, it was determined that, at most, their presence was temporary.355
In Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed its long-standing position regarding encroaching vegetation and
the imposition of liability on landowners when trees harm others because
of an encroachment.356 This position is that when trees constitute a
nuisance or pose a threat of imminent harm, they may be seen as unrea-
sonable. Specifically, guided by the common law maxim, Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, in cases of encroaching vegetation (when, as here,
a tree fell from private land and injured a vehicle traveling on a public
highway), it was held that “a plaintiff is limited to self-help unless the of-
fending plan is ‘noxious’ and caused damage to the plaintiff’s land.”357
What is intriguing when considering the breadth of aesthetic
nuisances is the socio-cultural context in which they are presented.358 In
350 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 73–76.
351 See generally Coquillette, supra note 39.
352 Justin Blum & Jennifer Lenhart, Enormous Flock Creates Flap in Loudon, WASH.




356 726 S.E. 2d 14 (Va. 2012).
357 Daniel Bidwell, Of Trees, Vegetation, and Torts: Re-Conceptualizing Reasonable Land
Use, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2013). Iterations of the Virginia Rule in determining
liability regimes are found in the courts of Hawaii and Massachusetts. Id. at 1041. It is
asserted that the dissent in Cline by Justice Lemons is the preferred position which seeks
to “impose a general negligence standard on landowners and subjects liability when they
knew, or should have known, of an unsafe condition posed by a tree.” Id. at 1059.
358 Supra notes 339–41.
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New Hampshire, for example, trees enhance property valuations and add
to the assessed value of panoramic views.359 In Loudoun County, Virginia,
trees can—by virtue of their shelter and inhabitance by black birds—be
seen as an aesthetic nuisance.360 And, encroaching vegetation as well as
dead trees may well also qualify as aesthetic nuisances.361 The standard of
reasonable use and conduct is shaped by local customs, uses and cultural
values within each community.362 Consequently, no codified standard of
reasonableness may be set. Rather, by placing reliance on the cost/benefit
template put forward by The Restatement (Second) of Torts, the extent to
which conduct—within a particular set of facts—is unreasonable may be
determined judicially.363
CONCLUSIONS
The Common Law serves as the foundation for a considerable num-
ber of environmental statutes and the regulatory schemes for implement-
ing these statutes at all levels of governance—local, state, and federal.364
As such, a full range of ecological issues are tackled by the Common Law,
and especially those involving the law of nuisance.365 Because of the flex-
ibility and the power of adaptability,366 the Common Law thus “plays a
critical role in shaping private litigation in United States environmental
law.”367 Inflexible environmental statutory directives are both moderated,
interpreted, and adjoined by the Common Law.368
Conflicts emanating from unaesthetic uses of land should be re-
solved through “a balancing test which incorporates the same ‘objective’
standard courts use” involving sounds and smells alleged to be unreason-
able: namely, by evaluating what the community holds to be reasonable.369
359 Supra notes 342–47.
360 Supra notes 352–54.
361 Bidwell, supra note 357, at 1043 n.53, 1053 n.119.
362 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 55.
363 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929 (1979).
364 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 69.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 90.
367 Id. at 69.
368 See id. at 57.
369 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 55. See also Coletta, supra note 333, at 157. On
balance, the “best way we have of accounting for the consequences of [environmental]
regulation” remains the cost-benefit analytical approach. The biggest challenge here is to
“humanize” this approach and to take into consideration intangible environmental values
which are often very difficult to quantify such as human dignity. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 47–64 (2014).
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Combining analysis of any consequences of the injured interest, together
with the relief sought, provides a sound objective standard of adjudicat-
ing cases under a theory of aesthetic nuisance.370
Beyond compensating a landowner for the economic damages as-
sociated with aesthetic nuisances,371 that individual should be compen-
sated, ideally, for the loss of enjoyment of life that the aesthetic nuisance
has created even though computational hurdles exist presently which
prevent achievement of this goal. “Aesthetic and environmental well-
being like economic well-being are important ingredients of the quality
of life in our society.”372 When an aesthetic nuisance impacts negatively
on an individual’s quality of life, it is only equitable that the injured party
be compensated for the harms caused.
Rather than evaluating and controlling taste or beauty, legal aes-
thetics should be concerned with protecting matters of economic and
social stability373 which form part of the specter of in-rem expectations
which result from the ownership of property.374 These expectations mean
simply that “all actors in the relevant community must recognize that
they are subject to a duty to abstain from interfering with such rights inso-
far as they are held by another member of the community.”375
A rich component of the Common Law is, as observed, the Public
Trust Doctrine.376 When coupled with acceptance of the state’s sovereign
ownership of wildlife377 and the co-ordinate recognition of wildlife as a vital
public trust resource, the Doctrine becomes a significant vector of force in
preserving environmental equilibrium so long as it not used capaciously.378
Another coupling which strengthens the environmental arsenal
of the Common Law is that of restorative awards379—especially when
aligned with application of equitable trust principles which would seek
to ensure that these awards are used for restoration and not personal
370 Smith & Fernandez, supra note 35, at 55.
371 See id. at 75.
372 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (per Stewart, J.).
373 See generally JOHN COSTONIS, ICONS AND ALIENS, LAW, AESTHETICS, AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHANGE (1989).
374 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1853 (2007).
375 Id. at 1853.
376 See supra notes 257–91 and text; see also Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36. But see
Thompson, supra note 289.
377 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 257.
378 See Smith & Sweeney, supra note 36, at 308; see also Thompson, supra note 289, at 55.
379 See Verdicchio, supra note 156.
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enrichment by successful party-plaintiffs.380 Although a judicial order for
restoration can create a tangible, objective remedy for harm, the remedy
is post ante.381 As well, the computational bases for making awards of
this type are exceedingly problematic.382
The extent to which individual preferences should be subordi-
nated to collective decisions aimed at maximizing macro land use value
should not, nor can it fully, be resolved by a priori rules set out in law
and in regulatory schemes.383 Political discourse must be widened to in-
clude the politics of environmentalism which, in turn, is placed within a
structure of concrete legal issues.384 Nonetheless, there should be a reali-
zation that accommodating ecological values in environmental protection
is quite contentious.385 Even with this effort of inclusion and accommoda-
tion, dysfunctionalism pervades the whole of environmental management
when it is realized—for example—that national land use controls are
fractured “into tens of thousands of small uncoordinated jurisdictions”386
and lack any “cogent framework.”387 Yet, almost paradoxically, local gov-
ernments are the primary forum for shaping environmental policy and
enforcing environmental laws.388 It nevertheless remains for the Common
Law to be the catalyst for testing the boundaries of unreasonable conduct
which impairs the environment, as well as being the strongest mecha-
nism for effecting sound environmental management and for preventing
the establishment of a dystopian society.389
380 See Brown, supra note 179.
381 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117.
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mental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 63, 66 (2003) (suggesting that environmental laws
do not reflect clearly articulated ethic that should be termed environmental).
384 Hornstein, supra note 13. See Christopher Stone, Do Morals Matter? The Influence on
Courts and Congress in Shaping U.S. Environmental Policies, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 13
(2003) (finding the moral status of Nature remains problematic in large part because
judges and legislators seldom acknowledge the relevance of any sort of moral philosophy
or environmental ethic).
385 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 8, at 117.
386 Id. at 368.
387 NOLON, supra note 20, at 255.
388 Id. at 367–68.
389 The fundamental principle of law found in the Common Law of both England and of
the United States “is to correct injustices and thereby vindicate the moral sense”—with
the conclusion being drawn that morality and efficiency are not inconsistent and that “on
balance adherence to generally accepted moral principles increases the wealth of society
more than reduces it.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 8.9 at 342 (8th
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